Tax Evasion and Monopoly Output Decisions: Note

Gideon Yaniv
Additional contact information
Gideon Yaniv: Tel-Aviv University National Insurance Institute, Israel

Public Finance Review, 1996, vol. 24, issue 4, 501-505

Abstract: This note readdresses the issue of monopoly profit tax evasion and its output decisions recently reexamined in this journal by Wang (1990) under the assumption that the probability of detection and the penalty rate increase with the amount of understated profit. The note shows that contrary to Wang's allegation, the separabil ity of the monopolist's output decision from its tax evasion behavior (obtained by Wang and Conant, 1988, under the assumption that the probability of detection and the penalty rate are exogenously fixed) still holds under his more realistic assump tions. Consequently, profit taxes are still neutral with respect to the monopolist's profit-ntaximizing output.

Date: 1996
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/109114219602400406 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:24:y:1996:i:4:p:501-505

DOI: 10.1177/109114219602400406

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Public Finance Review
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().