Voluntary Cutbacks and Pretreaty Behavior: the Helsinki Protocol and Sulfur Emissions

James Murdoch () and Todd Sandler

Public Finance Review, 1997, vol. 25, issue 2, 139-162

Abstract: This article formulates a noncooperative game model of sulfur emission reductions that accounts for the transboundary transport of emissions. Based on this model, European demand for emission reductions is derived from 1980 to 1985. In the early 1980s, information on sulfur emissions and depositions became available and allowed nations to assess their desired levels of emission reductions. We estimate European demand for cutbacks prior to the Helsinki Protocol's mandated reductions by using spatially autoregressive techniques. This demand depends on the price of emission cutbacks, national income, self-inflicted damage, baseline emission levels, and freedoms. Qualitative analysis lends support to the noncooperative depiction and our characterization of the Protocol as reflecting actions that many nations were already taking.

Date: 1997
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/109114219702500201 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:25:y:1997:i:2:p:139-162

DOI: 10.1177/109114219702500201

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Public Finance Review
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().