Specific Excise Taxation in a Unionized Differentiated Duopoly

Michele Santoni

Public Finance Review, 2000, vol. 28, issue 4, 351-371

Abstract: This article considers the incidence and welfare effects of a specific excise tax in a unionized duopoly model with differentiated products, linear demand and cost curves, and wage bargaining. The article allows for both Cournot and Bertrand competition. The article shows that unionization lowers the degree of undershifting of the tax on the producer's net price, the marginal increase in the consumer's price, and the employment loss. The excess burden of an equal revenue tax is higher with a unionized labor market and higher with Cournot than Bertrand competition. Unionization increases the optimal output subsidy with wage bargaining.

Date: 2000
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/109114210002800404 (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Specific excise taxation in a unionised differentiated duopoly (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:28:y:2000:i:4:p:351-371

DOI: 10.1177/109114210002800404

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Public Finance Review
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().