A Public Choice View of Tax Competition

Charles Blankart

Public Finance Review, 2002, vol. 30, issue 5, 366-376

Abstract: The author analyzes the role of competition among governments. Although traditional public finance economists fear that competition among governments may be too strong, endangering revenue generation or leading to destructive outcomes in the Tiebout model, this article argues that competition among governments, properly understood, may promote efficiency, but natural barriers to competition require regulation by democracy.

Date: 2002
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:30:y:2002:i:5:p:366-376

DOI: 10.1177/109114210203000503

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