Rent Seeking and Fixed-Share Pools in Government

Roger L. Faith
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Roger L. Faith: Arizona State University

Public Finance Review, 2002, vol. 30, issue 5, 442-455

Abstract: A fixed-share pool is a given amount of resources to be divided among a given number of claimants in which a claimant’s share of the pool is fixed exogenously. Consequently, rent seeking to increase one’s share of the pool is effectively eliminated. However, if claimants have sharing rights to more than one pool, rent seeking in the form of transferring resources from a pool where one has a small share to a pool where one has a large share will generally occur. A game-theoretic analysis of this type of rent seeking is discussed and then applied to a number of governmental settings.

Date: 2002
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:30:y:2002:i:5:p:442-455

DOI: 10.1177/109114210203000507

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