The Monopsony Power of the Median Voter

Brian L. Goff and Robert Tollison
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Brian L. Goff: Western Kentucky University

Public Finance Review, 2003, vol. 31, issue 2, 180-188

Abstract: This article attempts to establish a link between voting theory and price theory. The median voter is characterized as a monopsonist who sets a price for the winning vote in an election. As such, the median voter can extract rents from the political sector as a function of the price of substitute winning voters, which in turn will depend on the distribution of voter preferences.

Keywords: median voter; monopsony; rents; government (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:31:y:2003:i:2:p:180-188

DOI: 10.1177/1091142102250329

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