Tax Collection in History

Metin M. CoÅŸgel and Thomas J. Miceli
Additional contact information
Metin M. CoÅŸgel: University of Connecticut
Thomas J. Miceli: University of Connecticut, thomas.miceli@uconn.edu
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Metin Cosgel ()

Public Finance Review, 2009, vol. 37, issue 4, 399-420

Abstract: This article examines the rich variety of tax collection methods that have been employed throughout history. Three general categories have been observed: share contracts, rent contracts, and wage contracts, which differ depending on whether the government needs to measure the actual tax collected, the tax base, or the collector's effort, respectively. We develop a principal—agent model that seeks to explain the choice among these forms based on collector incentives, the value of state-specific collection effort, and measurement costs. We then review the actual use of the various forms in light of the model, both across countries and over time.

Keywords: tax collection; tax farming; share contracts; rent contracts; wage contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: Tax Collection in History (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:37:y:2009:i:4:p:399-420

DOI: 10.1177/1091142109331636

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