Corruption and Voter Participation
Peter Calcagno () and
William Shughart ()
Public Finance Review, 2012, vol. 40, issue 6, 789-815
The literature on voter turnout focuses on the determinants of the electorateâ€™s vote supply. There is growing recognition, however, that the demanders of votesâ€”candidates, political parties, and interest groupsâ€”have strong incentives to invest resources in mobilizing support on Election Day. The authors test the hypothesis that corruption rents increase the value of holding public office and, hence, elicit greater demand-side effort in building winning coalitions. Analyzing a pooled time-series data set of public officials convicted of misusing their offices between 1979 and 2005, we find, after controlling for other influential factors, that governmental corruption raises voter turnout rates in gubernatorial elections.
Keywords: political corruption; vote demand; voter turnout; rent seeking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:40:y:2012:i:6:p:789-815
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