Tax Incentives and Noncompliance
Annette AlstadsÃ¦ter and
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Annette Alstadsæter ()
Public Finance Review, 2018, vol. 46, issue 4, 609-634
Using rich Swedish administrative panel data, we are able to observe and analyze a specific type of tax noncompliance, namely, overstatement of a self-reported dividend allowance that can reduce shareholdersâ€™ tax liability. Some 3 percent of Swedish owner managers overstate this allowance during the period 2006 to 2009. Exploiting a large kink in the income tax schedule, we identify a positive and significant effect of the income tax rate on noncompliance. The estimated elasticity of noncompliance with respect to the marginal tax rate ranges from .5 to .7, depending on the specification.
Keywords: tax evasion; tax compliance; self-reporting; tax incentive (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:46:y:2018:i:4:p:609-634
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