The Politics of Checkbook Federalism
Public Finance Review, 2018, vol. 46, issue 4, 665-691
This article adopts the perspective of second-generation fiscal-federalism theory to provide an empirical assessment of Canadaâ€™s intergovernmental fiscal arrangements. In the context of the literature on the political economy of intergovernmental grant programs, it examines the influence of political considerations on the evolution of the Canadian fiscal arrangements under the Constitution Act of 1982 . Fixed-effect regression results exploiting data from the 1982 to 2012 period show a statistically significant relationship between changes in both federal and provincial electoral variables and changes in a provinceâ€™s total federal transfer revenues. Changes to social transfers appear to be more reactive to changes in the political environment than do changes in equalization transfers.
Keywords: federalism; transfers; elections (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:46:y:2018:i:4:p:665-691
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