Property Rights within Government and Devices to Increase Government Efficiency

Ryan C. Amacher and Robert D. Tollison
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Ryan C. Amacher: Arizona State University
Robert D. Tollison: Texas A & M University

Public Finance Review, 1976, vol. 4, issue 2, 151-158

Abstract: This paper demonstrates that bureaucratic decision-making is a more complex process than the literature that focuses narrowly on the lack of appropriability of gains and losses from efficient decision-making implies. The paper delineates some of the other types of constraints under which the governmental decision maker operates. These factors lead to the conclusion that there are many devices (like the volunteer army) that can move decision makers toward significantly more efficient decisions without the presence of appropriability (narrowly defined).

Date: 1976
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:4:y:1976:i:2:p:151-158

DOI: 10.1177/109114217600400202

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