A Public Choice Analysis of the Demand for Property Tax Circuit-Breaker Legislation

Thomas R. Ireland and William E. Mitchell
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Thomas R. Ireland: University of Missouri-St. Louis
William E. Mitchell: University of Missouri-St. Louis

Public Finance Review, 1976, vol. 4, issue 4, 379-394

Abstract: Circuit-breaker (C-B) legislation is legislation designed to give property tax relief to the elderly under formulas that involve state financing of the burden of tax loss, rather than letting it rest on local governments. At least 24 states have adopted such legislation in the past few years and it is being considered in many others. In this paper the nature of the demand for circuit-breaker legislation is evaluated from the perspective of why a nonelderly member of the voting public might choose to support it. The three basic factors considered are equity values favoring aid to the elderly, a desire for forced saving and self-insurance, and a desire to maintain the elderly in independent housing. This approach allows a meshing of the traditional normative and positive public choice methods of tax analysis.

Date: 1976
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:4:y:1976:i:4:p:379-394

DOI: 10.1177/109114217600400401

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