Fiscal Federalism: a Voting System Where Spillovers Taper Off Spatially

Robert Tollison and Thomas D. Willett
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Thomas D. Willett: Claremont Graduate School

Public Finance Review, 1978, vol. 6, issue 3, 327-342

Abstract: In this paper we present a point voting system with declining weights on votes Abstract for the representation of spillover interests among governments in a federalist system. In theory our model represents a formalization in terms of voting of Musgrave's proposal of varying benefit taxes to solve the problems caused by intergovernmental spillovers. We apply the voting system to a case of benefit incidence that tapers off spatially from a point of supply, although the principle involved can be generally applied to the whole range of benefit and cost spillover activities on expenditure items among governments on the same or differ ent levels. An important conclusion of our analysis is that there should ration ally be two-way representation and regional partial voting rights in the theory and practice of fiscal federalism.

Date: 1978
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:6:y:1978:i:3:p:327-342

DOI: 10.1177/109114217800600306

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