Soliciting Accurate Evaluations of Public Goods

A. H. Barnett
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A. H. Barnett: University of South Carolina

Public Finance Review, 1981, vol. 9, issue 2, 221-234

Abstract: Among the many problems faced by policy makers in attempts to use public funds efficiently, none is more troublesome than that of inducing users of public goods to reveal their demand prices. The difficulty in attempts to solicit demand prices falls under the general rubric of the free-rider problem, and is manifest in the propensity of users to behave strategically when asked to reveal evaluations. Several preference revelation devices have been proposed to surmount this problem, but all of these schemes are seriously flawed. This article presents a device which overcomes some of the flaws contained in previous work. The preference revealing mechanism proposed here is a bidding mechanism which takes advantage of the commonly found trait of risk-aversion to discourage strategic revelations.

Date: 1981
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:9:y:1981:i:2:p:221-234

DOI: 10.1177/109114218100900206

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