HISTORY-INDEPENDENT PREDICTION IN EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY

William Sandholm

Rationality and Society, 1998, vol. 10, issue 3, 303-326

Abstract: Three classes of models from evolutionary game theory are studied, which make history-independent predictions: stochastic stability, stochastic stability with local interaction and cheap talk. It is argued that of the three, only local interaction models yield credible history-independent predictions.

Keywords: evolutionary game theory; equilibrium selection; history dependence; conventions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:10:y:1998:i:3:p:303-326

DOI: 10.1177/104346398010003002

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