COLLECTIVE ACTION, SOCIAL DILEMMAS AND IDEOLOGY

Douglas D. Heckathorn

Rationality and Society, 1998, vol. 10, issue 4, 451-479

Abstract: Despite their diversity, political ideologies divide along a limited number of fault lines, including individualism versus collectivism, and authoritarianism versus democracy. Drawing on contemporary theories of collective action and game theory, this paper proposes a theoretic account of ideology that is based on the hypothesis that ideologies serve primarily to reconcile potential conflicts between individual and collective interests that arise in the course of collective action and other forms of social cooperation. The analysis concludes that five types of ideology are fundamental, each of which corresponds to a distinct form of social dilemma.

Keywords: collective action; ideology; rational choice; social dilemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:10:y:1998:i:4:p:451-479

DOI: 10.1177/104346398010004004

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