RECIPROCITY, TRUST, AND THE SENSE OF CONTROL

Nahoko Hayashi, Elinor Ostrom, James Walker and Toshio Yamagishi

Rationality and Society, 1999, vol. 11, issue 1, 27-46

Abstract: Most cognitive approaches for explaining cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma games include the view that many people believe that mutual cooperation is generally a gainful strategy to all parties and will cooperate when they think their partner cooperates. Proceeding along these lines, we argue that many participants treat a Prisoner's Dilemma game as an assurance game, and respond in a reciprocal manner to the choice or expected choice of their partner. We examine two bases for the expectation of a partner's cooperation in one-shot games: `general trust' and a `sense of control'. Further, we discuss why we expect general trust and a `sense of control'. Further, we discuss why we expect general trust and a sense of control to play different roles in societies, particularly in Japanese society and American society. Specifically, we test a general hypothesis that a sense of control plays a relatively more important role as a foundation for expectations in Japanese society and general trust plays the more important role in American society.

Keywords: trust; reciprocity; experimental; Prisoner's Dilemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (39)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:11:y:1999:i:1:p:27-46

DOI: 10.1177/104346399011001002

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