 CONVEX PREFERENCES AND POWER INEQUALITY IN EXCHANGE NETWORKSJoseph M. Whitmeyer Rationality and Society, 1999, vol. 11, issue 4, 419-442 Abstract: Early theorizing of power in exchange networks, by Homans and Emerson, was based explicitly on the principle that the more of a resource an actor acquires, the less the actor will value additional units of the resource. However, no previous empirical studies of effects of exchange network structure on power have embodied this principle. Generalizing the principle to convexity of actors' preferences, this study is the first to do so. This study experimentally tests the prediction that under specified conditions power inequalities will result in a Line3 ( A linked to B linked to C ) exchange network where actors' preferences are convex although the network is not characterized by the structural property of exclusion. That is, in the experimental network, linked actors divide pools of resources under exchange rules that mean that all actors can exchange with benefit with all other actors to whom they are linked. Payoffs to resources are specified by a function that operationalizes convexity of preferences. Results support the prediction: the central actor is advantaged in this situation. These results imply that convexity of preferences should be incorporated into theory and research concerning power in exchange networks. Keywords: power; exchange; social networks; convex preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:11:y:1999:i:4:p:419-442 DOI: 10.1177/104346399011004003 Access Statistics for this article More articles in Rationality and Society |
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