EXPRESSIVE VOTING

Alexander A. Schuessler

Rationality and Society, 2000, vol. 12, issue 1, 87-119

Abstract: For more than 40 years, rational choice theorists have noted that some voters may be expressively motivated. Their approaches generally have lacked a theoretical foundation with which such expressive motivation could be justified, and formalization typically has not gone beyond adding a non-instrumental utility term in a model of instrumental returns. I draw on social theory and anthropology to provide a microfoundation for expressive voting and propose an `economy' of expressive incentives, seeking out equilibrium conditions. This approach generates predictions about voter choice and turnout that are consistent with empirical evidence of electoral behavior.

Keywords: collective action; consumption benefit; expressive rationality; models; tipping; voting behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:12:y:2000:i:1:p:87-119

DOI: 10.1177/104346300012001005

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