PATTERNS OF COALITIONS IN EXCHANGE NETWORKS

Phillip Bonacich

Rationality and Society, 2000, vol. 12, issue 3, 353-373

Abstract: Coalitions between positions can alter the distribution of power in exchange networks. Hypotheses based on Bonacich and Bienenstock's (1997) latent class model for coalitions in exchange networks are tested using a new experimental paradigm for exchange networks, one that equally suggests both exchange and coalitions. This paradigm is based on the initial distribution of resources among participants. Pairs of positions combine their complementary resources to transact (exchange) and, on the other hand, sets of positions can use their monopoly control of resources to form coalitions. The results support the Bonacich and Bienenstock hypotheses but suggest that an additional factor may be involved: sets of actors who are alternative partners, and hence competitors, may also form coalitions even when these coalitions are not predicted by the latent class model.

Keywords: coalitions; exchange; networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:12:y:2000:i:3:p:353-373

DOI: 10.1177/104346300012003005

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