OVERCOMING MISTRUST

Andrew Kydd

Rationality and Society, 2000, vol. 12, issue 4, 397-424

Abstract: Trust is often held to promote cooperation, but mistrust can hinder it. This article looks at how trust can be built through strategic interaction. I formalize the common intuition that trust needs to be built through small initial cooperative gestures. These gestures are shown to overcome mistrust and facilitate cooperation in an n -person social dilemma game. The model lends support to the idea that trust can be a product of rational strategic interaction. I then extend the result in a related model that shows how trust can arise between nonaltruistic actors in iterated settings.

Keywords: cooperation; reassurance; trust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:12:y:2000:i:4:p:397-424

DOI: 10.1177/104346300012004003

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