COLLECTIVE PRECOMMITMENT FROM TEMPTATION

Brian J. Glenn

Rationality and Society, 2001, vol. 13, issue 2, 185-204

Abstract: The literature on precommitment in order to avoid temptation has provided a powerful analytical tool in explaining individual behavior. However, a thorough discussion is lacking of how groups of like-minded individuals work together to bind themselves through even more powerful strategies. There are binding strategies, and combinations of strategies, that are difficult (if not impossible) to pursue individually. Thus, by working together, individuals may increase the chances of successfully resisting temptation while lowering the costs of doing so as well. One example of collective precommitment is the case of the Amish and Social Security. Social Security not only went against the religious beliefs of the Amish, but threatened their very society as well. By studying the Amish case, we can see how individuals working collectively can bind themselves more effectively than they can by working alone.

Keywords: Amish; collective action; precommitment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:13:y:2001:i:2:p:185-204

DOI: 10.1177/104346301013002002

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