MIXED STRATEGIES IN THE MUGGING GAME
Robert Hoffmann ()
Rationality and Society, 2001, vol. 13, issue 2, 205-212
This note is a contribution to the debate on Steven Brams's Theory of Moves. In particular, it aims to show that standard game-theoretic concepts can both account for and explain the statistics concerning mugging incidents that Brams presents to support the better predictive power of his own theory.
Keywords: mixed strategy equilibrium; mugging game; theory of moves (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:13:y:2001:i:2:p:205-212
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