The Role of Strategic Threats in Refugee Resettlement

Lester A. Zeager
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Lester A. Zeager: Department of Economics, East Carolina University, Greenville, NC 27858-4353, USA zeagerl@mail.ecu.edu

Rationality and Society, 2002, vol. 14, issue 2, 159-191

Abstract: The Indochinese refugee crisis of 1978-79 is modeled as a prisoners' dilemma, with Thailand choosing whether to permit first asylum and the United States choosing whether to allow resettlement. A threat power analysis from the theory of moves helps to explain: (1) the threats by Thailand and other countries in the region to deny first asylum, and (2) the decision by the United States to (eventually) accept over 750,000 refugees for resettlement. The threats by Thailand shocked and outraged the international community, but the threat power analysis suggests that they were instrumental in escaping the prisoners' dilemma.

Keywords: game theory; refugees; Southeast Asia; strategic threats; theory of moves (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:14:y:2002:i:2:p:159-191

DOI: 10.1177/1043463102014002002

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