Covenants without Swords

Cristina Bicchieri

Rationality and Society, 2002, vol. 14, issue 2, 192-228

Abstract: In one-shot social dilemma experiments, cooperation rates dramatically increase if subjects are allowed to communicate before making a choice. There are two possible explanations for this `communication effect'. One is that communication enhances group identity, the other is that communication elicits social norms. I discuss both views and argue in favor of a norm-based explanation.

Keywords: communication; cooperation; group identity; social dilemmas; social norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (60)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:14:y:2002:i:2:p:192-228

DOI: 10.1177/1043463102014002003

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