Sanctioning Costs and Norm Enforcement

Christine Horne and Anna Cutlip
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Christine Horne: Department of Sociology, 800 SWKT, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT 84602, USA christine_horne@byu.edu
Anna Cutlip: Department of Sociology at Louisiana State University

Rationality and Society, 2002, vol. 14, issue 3, 285-307

Abstract: This article focuses on the relationship between the costs of norm enforcement and the extent to which such enforcement actually occurs. We predict that as costs increase, sanctioning of deviant behavior is less likely. In addition, however, costs have a positive effect on the strength of meta-norms that encourage sanctioning. These meta-norms, in turn, lead to more frequent enforcement. Hypotheses are tested using experimental methods and, for the most part, are supported.

Keywords: cohesion; meta-norms; norms; sanctioning; social control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:14:y:2002:i:3:p:285-307

DOI: 10.1177/1043463102014003002

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