The Logic of Collective Belief
Bryan Caplan
Rationality and Society, 2003, vol. 15, issue 2, 218-242
Abstract:
Many political failure arguments implicitly assume that voters are irrational. This article argues that this assumption is both theoretically and empirically plausible: in politics, rationality, like information, is a collective good that individuals have little incentive to supply. In consequence, voters are frequently not only rationally ignorant but also `rationally irrational'. Rational irrationality leads to both demand-side and supply-side political failures: competition not only pressures politicians to act on voters' biased estimates, but selects for politicians who genuinely share those biases. The analytical framework also sheds new light on log-rolling, political shirking and advertising, and politicians' human capital.
Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:15:y:2003:i:2:p:218-242
DOI: 10.1177/1043463103015002003
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