The Dilemma of Social Democracy in 1914

Francisco Herreros

Rationality and Society, 2003, vol. 15, issue 3, 325-344

Abstract: In 1914, socialist parties voted in favour of war credits. This was a surprising decision given their pre-war commitment to the keeping of peace. The decision has usually been explained by the so-called chauvinist preferences of the socialist leaders. In this article, an alternative hypothesis is advanced. A game theoretic model is used to explain why socialist parties betrayed their pre-war commitments. It is maintained that the socialist parties' voting decision is compatible with pacifist preferences. The game theoretic model indicates that socialist parties were trapped in a coordination problem that they could not solve. They voted in favour of war credits even though they were pacifists because they could not coordinate themselves in a joint negative vote. This conclusion goes against the common perception of historical fact.

Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:15:y:2003:i:3:p:325-344

DOI: 10.1177/10434631030153002

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