Spatial Strategies and Territoriality in the Maine Lobster Industry

James M. Acheson and Roy Gardner
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James M. Acheson: University of Maine, acheson@maine.edu

Rationality and Society, 2005, vol. 17, issue 3, 309-341

Abstract: Although territoriality of one kind or another is found in every society, our understanding of the way territorial systems come into being remains undeveloped. In this article, we use game theory to understand the evolution of institutional arrangements in the Maine lobster fishery. Nash equilibrium of models explains the three stages observed in the local-scale informal system of the past century. These stages are the result of decisions to invade or defend territorial lines that have changed over the course of time in response to a number of factors, including adoption of better technology, transportation costs, ecological changes, ability to organize defensive and offensive groups, and better law enforcement - all captured by crucial parameters of our model. We explore the broader implications of this industry study, especially the issues it raises for rational choice theory and the generation of institutions and norms.

Keywords: game theory; lobster; Maine; rational choice; territoriality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:17:y:2005:i:3:p:309-341

DOI: 10.1177/1043463105051634

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