Can Game(s) Theory Explain Culture?

Jenna Bednar and Scott Page
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Jenna Bednar: Political Science, University of Michigan, 426 Thompson St., PO Box 1248, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1248, USA; jbednar@umich.edu
Scott Page: Political Science, University of Michigan, 426 Thompson St., PO Box 1248, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1248, USA; spage@umich.edu

Rationality and Society, 2007, vol. 19, issue 1, 65-97

Abstract: The hallmarks of cultural behavior include consistency within and across individuals, variance between populations, behavioral stickiness, and possibly suboptimal performance. In this article, we build a formal framework within which these behavioral attributes emerge from the interactions of purposive agents. We then derive mathematical results showing these behaviors are optimal given our assumptions. Our framework rests on two primary assumptions: (1) agents play ensembles of games, not just single games as is traditionally the case in evolutionary game theory models; and (2) agents have finite cognitive capacity. Our analysis combines agent-based techniques and mathematics, enabling us to explore dynamics and to prove when the behaviors produced by the agents are equilibria. Our results provide game theoretic foundations for cultural diversity and agent-based support for how cultural behavior might emerge.

Keywords: agent-based models; bounded rationality; culture; emergence; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:19:y:2007:i:1:p:65-97

DOI: 10.1177/1043463107075108

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