Explaining Norm Enforcement

Christine Horne
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Christine Horne: Department of Sociology, 204 Wilson Hall, Washington State University, Pullman, WA 99164, USA, chorne@wsu.edu

Rationality and Society, 2007, vol. 19, issue 2, 139-170

Abstract: This article presents a theory of norm enforcement. Dominant accounts explain norms by referring to their consequences. On this view, norms are enforced when doing so increases the welfare of group members. While useful, such approaches do not explain much of what we observe. The theory developed here argues that while sanctioning consequences are part of the explanation, characteristics of social relations — in particular, interdependence — have significant effects. Hypotheses are tested using unique data that include quantitative behavioral measures of norm and metanorm enforcement. The results show that the effects of sanctioning benefits and costs vary depending on the level of interdependence between group members. Further, concern with social relations, not sanctioning benefits and costs, explains metanorm enforcement. The research therefore suggests that explanations that focus on the direct consequences of sanctioning, and that fail to incorporate characteristics of social relations, may produce inaccurate predictions. Accordingly, understanding the role of social relations is essential for explaining norm enforcement.

Keywords: norm; metanorm; sanction; norm enforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:19:y:2007:i:2:p:139-170

DOI: 10.1177/1043463107077386

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