Collective Action and the Second-Order Free-Rider Problem

Douglas D. Heckathorn
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Douglas D. Heckathorn: University of Missouri—Kansas City

Rationality and Society, 1989, vol. 1, issue 1, 78-100

Abstract: This article examines the relationship between the first- and second-order free-rider problems in collective sanction systems, with special emphasis on the relative robustness of cooperation in the first and second levels. The results indicate that second-order cooperation exhibits surprising robustness relative to first-order cooperation. The implication is that hypocrisy, though universally maligned, may play a crucial transitional role both in the emergence of collective action and in the continuity of collective action under adverse circumstances.

Date: 1989
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:1:y:1989:i:1:p:78-100

DOI: 10.1177/1043463189001001006

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