Games in Networks

Peter Abell
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Peter Abell: University of Surrey

Rationality and Society, 1989, vol. 1, issue 2, 259-282

Abstract: This article explores the implications of the use of time (the scarce input) in voluntary associations where members are rational maximizers but use time both “egoistically†and by “helping†others. The model leads to a picture of individuals subject to an internal prisoners' dilemma. In addition, the association is assumed to operate a division of labor where the use of “egoistic†time by one member impacts upon the utility of others. The interplay of three interrelated games is studied and implications for the use of time in associations are derived.

Date: 1989
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:1:y:1989:i:2:p:259-282

DOI: 10.1177/1043463189001002006

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