The Relationship Between the Supreme Court and Parliament in Light of the Theory of Moves: the Case of Israel

Assaf Meydani and Shlomo Mizrahi
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Assaf Meydani: Academic College of Tel-Aviv- Yaffo, Israel, assafmei@mta.ac.il
Shlomo Mizrahi: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel, shlomom@bgu.ac.il

Rationality and Society, 2010, vol. 22, issue 1, 55-82

Abstract: The relationship between the Supreme Court and the legislature has been studied from various angles. This paper develops a dynamic model using the Theory of Moves. The model is then applied to a path-dependence analysis of the relations between the Supreme Court and the parliament in Israel between 1970 and 2007. While at the beginning of this period the Supreme Court limited the ability of citizens to appeal in matters concerning decisions of the parliament and the government, by the end of the period it had expanded this ability significantly, thus implementing an informal policy of procedural judicial activism. More specifically, the empirical analysis traces three turning points in the path-dependence analysis, which can also be explained and understood as temporary equilibria in the dynamic interaction ultimately leading to a stable equilibrium.

Keywords: Israel; law and politics; new institutionalism; Supreme Court; Theory of Moves (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:22:y:2010:i:1:p:55-82

DOI: 10.1177/1043463109346469

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