Rationality and common knowledge

Herbert Gintis

Rationality and Society, 2010, vol. 22, issue 3, 259-282

Abstract: A central finding in interactive epistemology is that rational agents implement Nash equilibria when there is a commonality of knowledge in the form of common priors and common knowledge of key aspects of the strategic interaction. Epistemic game theory, however, fails to articulate the general conditions of knowledge sharing. This paper makes explicit the fundamental epistemological assumptions behind knowledge sharing.

Keywords: common knowledge; epistemic game theory; interactive epistemology; modal logic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:22:y:2010:i:3:p:259-282

DOI: 10.1177/1043463110375200

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