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Status groups and altruistic behaviour in dictator games

Ulf Liebe and Andreas Tutic
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Ulf Liebe: Universität Leipzig, Germany, liebe@sozio.uni-leipzig.de
Andreas Tutic: Universität Leipzig, Germany

Rationality and Society, 2010, vol. 22, issue 3, 353-380

Abstract: We provide evidence on the effects of social status in the dictator game. With regard to average donations from and to status groups, it turns out that (a) the higher the status of the dictator, the more she donates, and (b) the higher the status of the recipient, the less she receives in donations. Both tendencies are proposed by altruism. On a lower level of aggregation, we find that altruism has the highest proportion of correct predictions among all theoretical concepts under consideration (i.e. altruism, warm-glow giving, in-group bias, noblesse oblige). Surprisingly, there are rarely pure altruists on the individual level. This points at well-known problems of aggregation in social science research and challenges, among others, experimental studies on the in-group bias.

Keywords: altruism; in-group bias; noblesse oblige; social status; warm-glow giving (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:22:y:2010:i:3:p:353-380

DOI: 10.1177/1043463110366232

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