Explaining large-N cooperation: Generalized social trust and the social exchange heuristic

Kim Mannemar Sønderskov
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Kim Mannemar Sønderskov: Aarhus University, Denmark, ks@ps.au.dk

Rationality and Society, 2011, vol. 23, issue 1, 51-74

Abstract: This paper presents a new argument that links generalized social trust and collective action in situations with a large number of actors who do not have specific information on each other. Generalized social trust enhances large -N cooperation through the social exchange heuristic, which stimulates conditional cooperation in social dilemmas. Using data from a survey in four countries and recycling behavior as an indicator of collective action, this explanation is tested with individual-level data. While the relationship between generalized social trust and large -N collective action is often hypothesized, there is scant micro-level evidence as it has mainly been tested at the macro level. The results show that people holding generalized social trust cooperate more readily in large -N dilemmas, and that they most likely do so because of the social exchange heuristic.

Keywords: collective action; generalized social trust; pro-environmental behavior; social exchange heuristic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:23:y:2011:i:1:p:51-74

DOI: 10.1177/1043463110396058

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