Kula and relation capital: Rational reinterpretation of primitive gift institution

Jaehyuck Lee

Rationality and Society, 2011, vol. 23, issue 4, 475-512

Abstract: We take the view that social institution can be interpreted as equilibrium outcomes from the rational conduct of social exchanges. ‘Relation capital’ captures the idea that people make an optimal choice in their tie-makings as well as individual acts. We reinterpret from a rational choice perspective the well-known gift institution of primitive society documented by classical anthropological studies, the kula . We provide a detailed analysis of kula in terms of relation capital accumulation and fame building. The dynamic optimization perspective is applied to reinterpret various aspects of this ceremonial exchange. A formal model of the kula economy is provided to show the unstable nature of the gift equilibrium. Optimal time paths of consumption and gift-giving are derived, and a sufficient condition for the instability of the steady state is formally provided. Many qualitative discussions are characterized in terms of formal results, including the reason for the specific form of kula.

Keywords: dynamic optimization; generalized exchange; gift economy; kula; relation capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:23:y:2011:i:4:p:475-512

DOI: 10.1177/1043463111425011

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