Restraining free-riders: The effects of actor types and decision rules in the public goods game

Jan Sauermann and Ulrich Glassmann
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Jan Sauermann: University of Cologne, Germany
Ulrich Glassmann: University of Konstanz, Germany

Rationality and Society, 2014, vol. 26, issue 3, 290-319

Abstract: Many experiments comparing individual and group behavior find that groups behave more egoistically than individuals. However, most of these studies do not control for the influence of within-group decision-making rules that might have an important impact on group behavior. In this article, we report findings from laboratory experiments comparing individual and group behavior in a public goods game. We find that rather than cooperation levels differing between individuals and groups per se, the intragroup decision-making rule has an influence on the cooperativeness of groups. Groups decide either by majority or unanimity rule. While groups deciding by majority rule reach roughly the same level of cooperation as individuals, groups deciding by unanimity rule contribute significantly lower amounts to the public good.

Keywords: Cooperation; decision-making rule; group behavior; laboratory experiment; social dilemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:26:y:2014:i:3:p:290-319

DOI: 10.1177/1043463114533073

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