 Signaling commitments, making concessions: Democratization and state ratification of international human rights treaties, 1966–2006Min Zhou Rationality and Society, 2014, vol. 26, issue 4, 475-508 Abstract: How is the establishment of the international human rights regime possible in the first place? Bringing together theories from international law, political science, and sociology, I revisit the argument that global efforts to institutionalize human rights into international law are mainly driven by states undergoing democratization. Political democratization is crucial to the creation of the international human rights regime, because it generates “commitment†and “concession†mechanisms that motivate states to support human rights treaties. Analyzed by Cox event history models, the data on state ratification of the core United Nations human rights treaties from 1966 through 2006 are consistent with this argument. Improvement in human rights and increased political competition do significantly increase the rate of state ratification of human rights treaties. The ratification-promoting effect of democratization also operates in an immediate fashion. Overall, this study provides empirical support for the dynamic state-oriented explanation for global legalization of human rights and suggests a close connection between global democratization waves and the establishment of the human rights regime. Keywords: Democratization; event history model; human rights; human rights treaty (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:26:y:2014:i:4:p:475-508 Access Statistics for this article More articles in Rationality and Society |
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