The value of vengefulness: Reputational incentives for initiating versus reciprocating aggression

Stephen Benard

Rationality and Society, 2015, vol. 27, issue 2, 129-160

Abstract: Why do individuals engage in surprisingly costly aggression? Theory and research suggest that individuals aggress in order to establish a reputation as a strong competitor and thereby deter aggression from others. However, we know little about whether these reputational concerns lead individuals to initiate aggression or instead to reciprocate when challenged. Correspondingly, it is unclear whether initiating or reciprocating aggression provides greater reputational benefits. This study uses a behavioral experiment to investigate these questions and finds that (1) the opportunity to earn a reputation for reciprocating aggression increases aggressive behavior, while the opportunity to earn a reputation for initiating aggression does not; (2) reputations for reciprocating aggression more effectively deter aggression from interaction partners than reputations for initiating aggression; (3) reputations for reciprocating aggression are perceived as more convincing signals of underlying competitive ability than reputations for initiating aggression; and (4) individual competitive ability is an important moderator of the effect of reputation systems on aggressive behavior. The findings clarify the mechanism by which reputation systems promote aggressive behavior and help explain how the type of information available in a reputation system shapes levels of aggression.

Keywords: Aggression; cooperation; experiment; Hawk–Dove game; reputation; signaling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:27:y:2015:i:2:p:129-160

DOI: 10.1177/1043463115576135

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