 Punish and perish?Rationality and Society, 2015, vol. 27, issue 2, 195-223 Abstract: The evolution of large-scale cooperation among strangers is a fundamental unanswered question in the social sciences. Behavioral economics has persuasively shown that the so-called strong reciprocity plays a key role in accounting for the endogenous enforcement of cooperation. Insofar as strongly reciprocal players are willing to costly sanction defectors, cooperation flourishes. However, experimental evidence unambiguously indicates that not only defection and strong reciprocity, but also unconditional cooperation without punishment is a quantitatively important behavioral attitude. By referring to a prisoner’s dilemma framework where punishment (“stick†) and rewarding (“carrot†) options are available, here we show analytically that the presence of cooperators who don’t punish in the population makes altruistic punishment evolutionarily weak. We show that cooperation breaks down and strong reciprocity is maladaptive if costly punishment means “punishing defectors†and, even more so, if it is coupled with costly rewarding of cooperators. In contrast, punishers do not perish if cooperators, far from being rewarded, are sanctioned . These results, based on an extended notion of strong reciprocity, challenge evolutionary explanations of cooperation that overlook the “dark side†of altruistic behavior. Keywords: Altruistic punishment; cooperation; heterogeneous types; social evolution; strong reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:27:y:2015:i:2:p:195-223 Access Statistics for this article More articles in Rationality and Society |
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