Realizing “strategic†voting in presidential primaries

Gar Culbert

Rationality and Society, 2015, vol. 27, issue 2, 224-256

Abstract: Those who study vote choice in presidential nominating contests often ask, “Are voters sincere (voting with their ‘true’ preferences), are they sophisticated (giving more weight to a candidate’s chances of winning the nomination), or are they strategic (placing greater value on a candidate’s chances of winning a general election)?†By analyzing survey data from the 1984, 1988, 2000, and 2004 presidential nominating contests, this study argues that voters are more strategic than previously understood, and that prior studies, confined by methodology and data, are often mistaken when they maintain that primary voters are sophisticated. In actuality, primary voters are more likely to cast strategic votes, and not sophisticated ones.

Keywords: Presidential primaries; rational choice; strategic voting; voting behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:27:y:2015:i:2:p:224-256

DOI: 10.1177/1043463115576139

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