Are dictators loss averse?

Trond U Halvorsen

Rationality and Society, 2015, vol. 27, issue 4, 469-491

Abstract: This paper investigates whether individuals are loss averse with respect to their status quo wealth level in sharing situations. In a real-effort dictator game, dictators are asked to share their earnings either before or after earning them. The instructions also variably emphasize the amount that the dictator will give or receive at the end of the experiment. This study finds that whether the money is already earned or not has no statistically significant effects on the average sharing behavior, regardless of which instructions are used. The results indicate that dictator game participants are not loss averse with respect to their status quo wealth level.

Keywords: Dictator game; loss aversion; real effort; reference dependence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:27:y:2015:i:4:p:469-491

DOI: 10.1177/1043463115605302

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