Party–voter linkages derived from the calculus of voting model: Electoral mobilization in Ecuador

Thomas Mustillo

Rationality and Society, 2016, vol. 28, issue 1, 24-51

Abstract: This article derives a theory of party–voter linkages. It uses the decision theoretic calculus of voting model to theorize about political party strategies to mobilize voters under democratic competition. I show that parties will devise categorically distinct linkage strategies to operate upon different terms in the calculus of voting model. In particular, the theory implies four strategies: programmatic, clientelist, symbolic, and vote-buying. I illustrate their empirical relevance with case narratives of four parties in Ecuador.

Keywords: Calculus of voting; clientelism; Ecuador; mobilization; party–voter linkages; vote-buying (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:28:y:2016:i:1:p:24-51

DOI: 10.1177/1043463115621516

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