The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems
Roy Gardner,
Elinor Ostrom and
James Walker
Rationality and Society, 1990, vol. 2, issue 3, 335-358
Abstract:
This article presents a conceptual framework for theoretical and empirical analysis of the multiplicity of behavioral problems encountered in common-pool resources (CPRs). This framework is used to specify more clearly the strategic content of CPR dilemmas and to show their interaction. The framework shows how general theoretical constructs (e.g., Prisoner's Dilemma and coordination games) apply to these behavioral dilemmas. Finally, results from a case study and a set of laboratory experiments demonstrate the applicability of this framework in designing and conducting empirical research on CPRs.
Date: 1990
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:2:y:1990:i:3:p:335-358
DOI: 10.1177/1043463190002003005
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