Regulation and state capacity

Arjun Chowdhury

Rationality and Society, 2022, vol. 34, issue 4, 446-468

Abstract: While one might expect states with low capacity to regulate less than states with high capacity, this is not supported by evidence, leaving open the possibility of rent-seeking. I use the example of the regulation of witchcraft in parts of Africa to informally model the conditions under which states with low capacity still come to promulgate a range of regulations even in the absence of rent-seeking interests. The model suggests that regulation can be a substitute for basic state functions like policing. I identify one normatively troubling aspect of this; the conditions under which such regulation might still improve state capacity over time, which qualifies claims made about rent-seeking and neo-patrimonialism; the model’s implications for contemporary state formation; and the parallels between the regulation of witchcraft and the regulation of offensive speech.

Keywords: State capacity; regulation; rent-seeking; neo-patrimonialism; witchcraft (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:34:y:2022:i:4:p:446-468

DOI: 10.1177/10434631221130850

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