A strategic model of polytheism

Laurent Gauthier

Rationality and Society, 2024, vol. 36, issue 4, 480-501

Abstract: We consider a formal model of polytheistic religion, where worshippers choose gods to address, and expect benefits in return. At the game-theoretic equilibrium, they choose gods optimally depending on how the gods return favors, as a function of divine efficiency. This efficiency can be modeled based on a random growth model of prayer benefit, and results in worship acts following power laws. A reduction in the range of random events associated to the various divinities, or to their range of interpretations, leads to more concentration of worship towards less divinities.

Keywords: game theory; polytheism; power laws; random growth models; theory of religious economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:36:y:2024:i:4:p:480-501

DOI: 10.1177/10434631241269525

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