The Dynamics of Income Inequality in a Representative Democracy

Peter van WIJCK and Wil Arts
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Peter van WIJCK: Erasmus University
Wil Arts: Erasmus University

Rationality and Society, 1991, vol. 3, issue 3, 317-342

Abstract: This article investigates the causes of income inequality in a representative democracy. The starting point of the analysis is Lenski's orienting statement that these dynamics can be explained by referring to political behavior that first became possible as a consequence of the institutionalization of democratic ideology. Two competing explanations are considered. The first originates from Lenski's technological-evolutionary theory of human societies, while the second is based on Downs's economic theory of democracy. Using time-series data pertaining to the case of the Netherlands, predictions derived from these theories are empirically tested. The Downsian explanation appears to be theoretically as well as empirically preferable to the Lenskian one.

Date: 1991
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:3:y:1991:i:3:p:317-342

DOI: 10.1177/1043463191003003005

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