The Price of Influence in an Interest-Group Economy

W. Crain, Robert Tollison and Thomas H. Deaton
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Thomas H. Deaton: General Telephone and Electric Company

Rationality and Society, 1991, vol. 3, issue 4, 437-449

Abstract: The size and number of political interest groups is analyzed using the firm-industry framework of standard microeconomic theory. The model allows for the entry and exit of interest groups in the interest-group industry, as well as adjustments in the size of individual interest groups. The structural characteristics of the market for legislation (i.e., the costs of procuring influence) drives these adjustments in political coalitions and interest groups. Empirical evidence on the relationship of coalition adjustments to changes in various characteristics of legislatures is provided using data on U.S. states.

Date: 1991
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:3:y:1991:i:4:p:437-449

DOI: 10.1177/1043463191003004004

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